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Abstract
Private information retrieval (PIR) is the problem of retrieving as efficiently as possible, one
out of K messages from N non-communicating replicated databases (each holds all K messages)
while keeping the identity of the desired message index a secret from each individual database.
The information theoretic capacity of PIR (equivalently, the reciprocal of minimum download
cost) is the maximum number of bits of desired information that can be privately retrieved
per bit of downloaded information. T -private PIR is a generalization of PIR to include the
requirement that even if any T of the N databases collude, the identity of the retrieved message
remains completely unknown to them. Robust PIR is another generalization that refers to the
scenario where we have M ≥ N databases, out of which any M −N may fail to respond. For
K messages and M ≥ N databases out of which at least some N must respond, we show that
the capacity of T -private and Robust PIR is
(
1 + T/N + T 2/N2 + · · ·+ TK−1/NK−1
)
−1
. The
result includes as special cases the capacity of PIR without robustness (M = N) or T -privacy
constraints (T = 1).
1 Introduction
The private information retrieval (PIR) problem is motivated by the desire to protect the privacy
of a user against data providers. Besides its direct applications in data privacy, it is intimately
related to many fundamental problems in cryptography, e.g., oblivious transfer [1], instance hiding
[2, 3, 4], secure multiparty computation [5], and secret sharing schemes [6, 7]. The significance of
PIR also extends beyond security, through its fundamental connections to other prominent topics
such as locally decodable codes [8] and batch codes [9] in coding theory, relationships between
communication and computation [10] in complexity theory, and most recently blind interference
alignment [11] in wireless communications. In fact most constructions of locally decodable codes
are translated directly from PIR schemes. Through the connections between locally decodable
and locally recoverable codes [12], PIR also connects to distributed data storage repair [13] and
index coding [14], which in turn encompass all of network coding [15]. Therefore PIR represents
an important focal point to tackle significant challenges across these fields.
The goal of PIR is to find the most efficient way for a user to retrieve a desired message from
a set of N distributed databases, each of which stores all K messages, without revealing anything
Hua Sun (email: huas2@uci.edu) and Syed A. Jafar (email: syed@uci.edu) are with the Center of Pervasive
Communications and Computing (CPCC) in the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS)
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(in the information theoretic sense1) about which message is being retrieved, to any individual
database. The PIR problem was initially studied in the setting where each message is one bit
long [19, 20, 21, 22, 8, 23], where the cost of a PIR scheme is measured by the total amount of
communication between the user and the databases, i.e., the sum of communications from the user
to the databases (upload) and from the databases to the user (download). What is pursued in
this work is the traditional Shannon theoretic formulation, where message size is allowed to be
arbitrarily large, and therefore the upload cost is negligible compared to the download cost [24, 20].
The information theoretic capacity of PIR is the maximum number of bits of desired information
that can be privately retrieved per bit of downloaded information. Equivalently, it is the reciprocal
of the minimum possible download cost per bit of desired message. In [25], we showed that the
information theoretic capacity of PIR, for arbitrary number of messages K and arbitrary number
of databases N is
(
1 + 1/N + 1/N2 + · · ·+ 1/NK−1
)−1
.
There are several interesting extensions of PIR that explore its limitations under additional
constraints. These include extensions where up to T of the N databases may collude [26, 27]
(T -private PIR); where some of the databases may not respond [28] (Robust PIR); where both
the privacy of the user and the databases must be protected [1] (Symmetric PIR); where only one
database holds all the messages and all other databases hold independent information [29]; where
retrieval operations are unsynchronized [30]; and where beyond communications, computation is
also a concern [31]. There is also much recent work in the distributed storage setting [32, 24, 33, 34]
(the databases form a distributed storage system) where the main focus is on how the coding of
the storage system works jointly with PIR.
In this work, we mainly consider T -private PIR in the Shannon theoretic setting, where we
have an arbitrary number of messages (K), arbitrary number of databases (N), each database
stores all the messages, the messages are allowed to be arbitrarily large, and the privacy of the
desired message index must be guaranteed even if any T of the N databases collude. The main
contribution of this work is to show that the information theoretic capacity of T -private PIR is(
1 + T/N + T 2/N2 + · · ·+ TK−1/NK−1
)−1
.
We further consider the extension to robust T -private PIR, where we have M ≥ N databases,
out of which any M −N databases may not respond, so that with answers from any N databases,
we need to ensure both privacy and correctness. In this context, the contribution of this work is to
show that the information theoretic capacity of robust T -private PIR remains the same as that of
T -private PIR, i.e., there is no capacity cost from not knowing in advance which N databases will
respond.
Notation: For n1, n2 ∈ Z, n1 ≤ n2, define the notation [n1 : n2] as the set {n1, n1 + 1, · · · , n2}
and (n1 : n2) as the vector (n1, n1+1, · · · , n2). For an index set I = {i1, i2, · · · , in}, the notation AI
represents the set {Ai : i ∈ I}. For an index vector I = (i1, i2, · · · , in), the notation AI represents
the vector (Ai1 , Ai2 , · · · , Ain). For a matrix S, the notation S[I, :] represents the submatrix of S
formed by retaining only the rows corresponding to the elements of the vector I. The notation
X ∼ Y is used to indicate that X and Y are identically distributed.
1There is another line of research, where privacy needs to be satisfied only for computationally bounded databases
[16, 17, 18].
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2 Problem Statement
2.1 T -private PIR
Consider K independent messages W1, · · · ,WK of size L bits each.
H(W1, · · · ,WK) = H(W1) + · · ·+H(WK), (1)
H(W1) = · · · = H(WK) = L. (2)
There are N databases. Each database stores all the messages W1, · · · ,WK . A user wants to
retrieve Wk, k ∈ [1 : K] subject to T -privacy, i.e., without revealing anything about the message
identity, k, to any colluding susbset of up to T out of the N databases.
To retrieve Wk privately, the user generates N queries Q
[k]
1 , · · · , Q
[k]
N , where the superscript
denotes the desired message index. Since the queries are generated with no knowledge of the
realizations of the messages, the queries must be independent of the messages,
I(W1, · · · ,WK ;Q
[k]
1 , · · · , Q
[k]
N ) = 0. (3)
The user sends query Q
[k]
n to the n-th database, ∀n ∈ [1 : N ]. Upon receiving Q
[k]
n , the n-th
database generates an answering string A
[k]
n , which is a deterministic function of Q
[k]
n and the data
stored (i.e., all messages W1, · · · ,WK),
H(A[k]n |Q
[k]
n ,W1, · · · ,WK) = 0. (4)
Each database returns to the user its answer A
[k]
n . From all answers A
[k]
1 , · · · , A
[k]
N , the user can
decode the desired message Wk,
[Correctness] H(Wk|A
[k]
1 , · · · , A
[k]
N , Q
[k]
1 , · · · , Q
[k]
N ) = 0. (5)
To satisfy the privacy constraint that any T colluding databases learn nothing about the desired
message index k information theoretically, any T queries must be independent of k. Let T be a
subset of [1 : N ] and its cardinality be denoted by |T |. Q
[k]
T represents the subset {Q
[k]
n , n ∈ T }.
A
[k]
T is defined similarly. To satisfy the T -privacy requirement we must have
[Privacy] I(Q
[k]
T ; k) = 0,∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T. (6)
As the answering string is a deterministic function of the query and all messages, any set of T
answering strings must be independent of k as well,
I(A
[k]
T ; k) = 0,∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T. (7)
To underscore that any set of T or fewer answering strings is independent of the desired message
index, we may suppress the superscript and write AT directly instead of A
[k]
T , and express the
elements of such a set as An instead of A
[k]
n .
The metric that we study in this paper is the PIR rate, which characterizes how many bits of
desired information are retrieved per downloaded bit. Note that the PIR rate is the reciprocal of
download cost. The rate R of a PIR scheme is defined as follows.
R
△
=
L∑N
n=1H(An)
. (8)
The capacity, C, is the supremum of R over all PIR schemes.
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2.2 Robust T -private PIR
The robust T -private PIR problem is defined similar to the T -private PIR problem. The only
difference is that instead of N databases, we have M ≥ N databases, and the correctness condition
needs to be satisfied when the user collects any N out of the M answering strings.
3 Main Result: Capacity of Robust T -Private PIR
The following theorem states the main result.
Theorem 1 For T -private PIR with K messages and N databases, the capacity is
C =
(
1 + T/N + T 2/N2 + · · ·+ TK−1/NK−1
)−1
. (9)
The capacity of PIR with T colluding databases generalizes the case without T -privacy con-
straints, where T = 1 [25]. The capacity is a strictly decreasing function of T . When T = N , the
capacity is 1/K, meaning that the user has to download all K messages to be private, as in this
case, the colluding databases are as strong as the user. Similar to the T = 1 case, the capacity is
strictly deceasing in the number of messages, K, and strictly increasing in the number of databases,
N . When the number of messages approaches infinity, the capacity approaches 1−T/N , and when
the number of databases approaches infinity (T remains constant), the capacity approaches 1. Fi-
nally, note that since the download cost is the reciprocal of the rate, the capacity characterization
in Theorem 1 equivalently characterizes the optimal download cost per message bit for T -private
PIR as
(
1 + T/N + T 2/N2 + · · ·+ TK−1/NK−1
)
bits.
The capacity-achieving scheme that we construct for T -private PIR, generalizes easily to incor-
porate robustness constraints. As a consequence, we are also able to characterize the capacity of
robust T -private PIR. This result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 The capacity of robust T -private PIR is
C =
(
1 + T/N + T 2/N2 + · · ·+ TK−1/NK−1
)−1
. (10)
Since the capacity expressions are the same, we note that there is no capacity penalty from not
knowing in advance which N databases will respond. Even though this uncertainty increases as M
increases, capacity is not a function of M . However, we note that the communication complexity
of our capacity achieving scheme does increase with M .
4 Proof of Theorem 1: Achievability
There are two key aspects of the achievable scheme – 1) the query structure, and 2) the specialization
of the query structure to ensure T -privacy and correctness. While the query structure is different
from the T = 1 setting of [25], it draws upon the iterative application of the same three principles
that were identified in [25]. These principles are listed below.
(1) Enforcing Symmetry Across Databases
(2) Enforcing Message Symmetry within the Query to Each Database
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(3) Exploiting Previously Acquired Side Information of Undesired Messages to Retrieve New De-
sired Information
The specialization of the structure to ensure T -privacy and correctness is another novel element of
the achievable scheme. To illustrate how these ideas work together in an iterative fashion, we will
present a few simple examples corresponding to small values of K,N and T , and then generalize it
to arbitrary K,N and T . Let us begin with a lemma.
Lemma 1 Let S1, S2, · · · , SK ∈ F
α×α
q be K random matrices, drawn independently and uniformly
from all α × α full-rank matrices over Fq. Let G1, G2, · · · , GK ∈ F
β×β
q be K invertible square
matrices of dimension β×β over Fq. Let I1,I2, · · · ,IK ∈ N
β×1 be K index vectors, each containing
β distinct indices from [1 : α]. Then
(G1S1[I1, :], G2S2[I2, :], · · · , GKSK [IK , :]) ∼ (S1[(1 : β), :], S2[(1 : β), :], · · · , SK [(1 : β), :]) (11)
where Si[Ii, :], i ∈ [1 : K] are β × α matrices comprised of the rows of Si with indices in Ii.
Proof: We wish to prove that the left hand side of (11) is identically distributed (recall that the
notation X ∼ Y means that X and Y are identically distributed) to the right hand side of (11).
Because the rank of a matrix does not depend on the ordering of the rows, we have
(S1[I1, :], S2[I2, :], · · · , SK [IK , :]) ∼ (S1[(1 : β), :], S2[(1 : β), :], · · · , SK [(1 : β), :])
Since Si are picked uniformly from all full-rank matrices, conditioned on any feasible value of
the remaining rows Si[(β + 1 : α), :], the first β rows Si[(1 : β), :] are uniformly distributed over
all possibilities that preserve full-rank for Si. Now note that the mapping from Si[(1 : β), :]
to GiSi[(1 : β), :] is bijective, and Si[(1 : β), :] spans the same row space as GiSi[(1 : β), :], i.e.,
replacing Si[(1 : β), :] with GiSi[(1 : β), :], preserves Si as a full-rank matrix. Therefore, conditioned
on any feasible Si[(β + 1 : α), :], the set of feasible values of Si[(1 : β), :] is the same as the set of
feasible GiSi[(1 : β), :] values. Therefore, GiSi[(1 : β), :] is also uniformly distributed over the same
set. Finally, since the Si are chosen independently, the statement of Lemma 1 follows.
4.1 K = 2 Messages, N = 3 Databases, T = 2 Colluding Databases
The capacity for this setting, is C =
(
1 + 23
)−1
= 35 .
4.1.1 Query Structure
We begin by constructing a query structure, which will then be specialized to achieve correctness
and privacy. Without loss of generality, let [ak] denote the symbols of the desired message, and [bk]
the symbols of the undesired message.
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2 a3, a4
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2 a3, a4 a5, a6
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2 a3, a4 a5, a6
b1, b2 b3, b4 b5, b6
· · ·
· · ·
(3)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2 a3, a4 a5, a6
b1, b2 b3, b4 b5, b6
a7 + b7 a8 + b8
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2 a3, a4 a5, a6
b1, b2 b3, b4 b5, b6
a7 + b7 a8 + b8 a9 + b9
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We start by requesting the first TK−1 = 2 symbols from each of the first T = 2 databases:
a1, a2 from DB1, and a3, a4 from DB2. Applying database symmetry, we simultaneously request
a5, a6 from DB3. Next, we enforce message symmetry, by including queries for b1, · · · , b6 as the
counterparts for a1, · · · , a6. Now consider the first T = 2 databases, i.e., DB1 and DB2, which
can potentially collude with each other. Unknown to these databases the user has acquired two
symbols of external side information, b5, b6, comprised of undesired message symbols received from
DB3. Splitting the two symbols of external side information among DB1 and DB2 allows the
user one symbol of side information for each of DB1 and DB2 that it can exploit to retrieve new
desired information symbols. In our construction of the query structure, we will assign new labels
to the external side-information exploited within each database, e.g., b7 for DB1 and b8 for DB2,
with the understanding that eventually when the dependencies within the structure are specialized,
b7, b8 will turn out to be functions of previously acquired side-information. Using its assigned side
information, each DB acquires a new symbol of desired message, so that DB1 requests a7 + b7 and
DB2 requests a8 + b8. Finally, enforcing symmetry across databases, DB3 requests a9 + b9. At
this point, the construction is symmetric across databases, the query to any database is symmetric
in itself across messages, and the amount of side information exploited within any T colluding
databases equals the amount of side information available external to those T databases. So the
skeleton of the query structure is complete.
Note that if DB1 and DB2 collude, then the external side information is b5, b6, so we would like
the side-information that is exploited by DB1 and DB2, i.e., b7, b8 to be functions of the external
side information that is available, i.e., b5, b6. However, since any T = 2 databases can collude, it is
also possible that DB1 and DB3 collude instead, in which case we would like b7, b9 to be functions
of side information that is external to DB1 and DB3, i.e., b3, b4. Similarly, if DB2 and DB3 collude,
then we would like b8, b9 to be functions of b1, b2. How to achieve such dependencies in a manner
that preserves privacy and ensures correctness is the remaining challenge. Intuitively, the key is
to make b7, b8, b9 depend on all side-information b1, b2, · · · , b6 in a generic sense. In other words,
we will achieve the desired functional dependencies by viewing b1, b2, · · · , b9 as the outputs of a
(9, 6) MDS code, so that any 3 of these bk are functions of the remaining 6. The details of this
specialization are described next.
4.1.2 Specialization to Ensure Correctness and Privacy
Let each message consist of NK = 9 symbols from a sufficiently large2 finite field Fq. The messages
W1, W2 ∈ F
9×1
q are then represented as 9× 1 vectors over Fq. Let S1, S2 ∈ F
9×9
q represent random
matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly from all 9×9 full-rank matrices
over Fq. Without loss of generality, let us assume that W1 is the desired message. Define the 9× 1
vectors a[1:9] ∈ F
9×1
q and b[1:9] ∈ F
9×1
q , as follows
a[1:9] = S1W1 (12)
b[1:9] = MDS9×6S2[(1 : 6), :]W2 (13)
where S2[(1 : 6), :] is a 6 × 9 matrix comprised of the first 6 rows of S2. MDS9×6 is the generator
matrix of a (9, 6) MDS code (e.g., a Reed Solomon code). The generator matrix does not need to
be random, i.e., it may be globally known. Note that because of the MDS property, any 6 rows of
MDS9×6 form a 6× 6 invertible matrix. Therefore, from any 6 elements of b[1:9], all 9 elements of
2The requirements on the size of the field have to do with the existence of MDS codes that are used in the
construction. In this case q ≥ NK is sufficient.
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b[1:9] can be recovered. For example, from b1, b2, · · · , b6, one can recover b7, b8, b9. The queries from
each database are constructed according to the structure described earlier.
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2 a3, a4 a5, a6
b1, b2 b3, b4 b5, b6
a7 + b7 a8 + b8 a9 + b9
(14)
Correctness is easy to see, because the user recovers b[1:6] explicitly, from which it can recover all
b[1:9], thereby allowing it to recover all of a[1:9]. Let us see why privacy holds. The queries for any
T = 2 colluding databases are comprised of 6 variables from a[1:9] and 6 variables from b[1:9]. Let
the indices of these variables be denoted by the 6× 1 vectors Ia,Ib ∈ N
6×1, respectively, so that,
(aIa , bIb) = (S1[Ia, :]W1,MDS9×6[Ib, :]S2[(1 : 6), :]W2) (15)
∼ (S1[(1 : 6), :]W1, S2[(1 : 6), :]W2) (16)
where (16) follows from Lemma 1 because MDS9×6[Ib, :] is an invertible 6×6 matrix. Therefore, the
random map from W1 to aIa variables is i.i.d. as the random map from W2 to bIb , and privacy is
guaranteed. Note that since 9 desired symbols are recovered from a total of 15 downloaded symbols,
the rate achieved by this scheme is 9/15 = 3/5, which matches the capacity for this setting. While
this specialization suffices for our purpose (it achieves capacity), we note that further simplifications
of the scheme are possible, which allow it to operate over smaller fields and with lower upload cost.
Such an example is provided in the conclusion section of this paper.
4.2 K = 2 Messages, N = 4 Databases, T = 2 Colluding Databases
The capacity for this setting, is C =
(
1 + 24
)−1
= 23 .
4.2.1 Query Structure
The query structure is constructed as follows.
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a1, a2 a3, a4
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a1, a2 a3, a4 a5, a6 a7, a8
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a1, a2 a3, a4 a5, a6 a7, a8
b1, b2 b3, b4 b5, b6 b7, b8
· · ·
· · ·
(3)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a1, a2 a3, a4 a5, a6 a7, a8
b1, b2 b3, b4 b5, b6 b7, b8
a9 + b9 a11 + b11
a10 + b10 a12 + b12
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a1, a2 a3, a4 a5, a6 a7, a8
b1, b2 b3, b4 b5, b6 b7, b8
a9 + b9 a11 + b11 a13 + b13 a15 + b15
a10 + b10 a12 + b12 a14 + b14 a16 + b16
As before, we start by requesting TK−1 = 2 symbols of desired message from each of the first T = 2
databases. After enforcing symmetries across databases and then across messages, we consider
the first T databases (DB1 and DB2) and measure the total amount of external side information
available outside DB1 and DB2, which turns out to be 4 symbols (b5, b6, b7, b8). This gives us
our budget of 2 symbols of side information per database to be exploited to retrieve new desired
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information symbols. Assigning new labels to the side information symbols being exploited by each
database, we add a9+ b9, a10+ b10 to the query from DB1 and a11+ b11, a12+ b12 to the query from
DB2. Finally, enforcing symmetry across databases, corresponding queries are added to DB3 and
DB4. At this point all symmetries are satisfied and the amounts of side-information available and
exploited are balanced. Thus the structure is complete.
4.2.2 Specialization
Let each message consist of NK = 16 symbols from a sufficiently large finite field Fq. The messages
W1, W2 ∈ F
16×1
q are therefore represented as 16× 1 vectors over Fq. Let S1, S2 ∈ F
16×16
q represent
random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly from all 16 × 16 full-
rank matrices over Fq. Without loss of generality, let us assume that W1 is the desired message.
Define 16× 1 vectors a[1:16] ∈ F
16×1
q and b[1:16] ∈ F
16×1
q , as follows
a[1:16] = S1W1 (17)
b[1:16] = MDS16×8S2[(1 : 8), :]W2 (18)
where S2[(1 : 8), :] is a 8× 16 matrix comprised of the first 8 rows of S2. MDS16×8 is the generator
matrix of a (16, 8) MDS code. Plugging into the query structure obtained above,
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a1, a2 a3, a4 a5, a6 a7, a8
b1, b2 b3, b4 b5, b6 b7, b8
a9 + b9 a11 + b11 a13 + b13 a15 + b15
a10 + b10 a12 + b12 a14 + b14 a16 + b16
the proof of correctness and privacy follows from the same reasoning as in the previous example.
Note that since 16 desired symbols are recovered from a total of 24 downloaded symbols, the rate
achieved by this scheme is 16/24 = 2/3, which matches the capacity for this setting.
4.3 K = 2 Messages, N = 4 Databases, T = 3 Colluding Databases
The capacity for this setting, is C =
(
1 + 34
)−1
= 47 .
4.3.1 Query Structure
The query structure is constructed as follows.
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a1, a2, a3 a4, a5, a6 a7, a8, a9
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a1, a2, a3 a4, a5, a6 a7, a8, a9 a10, a11, a12
· · ·
· · ·
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a1, a2, a3 a4, a5, a6 a7, a8, a9 a10, a11, a12
b1, b2, b3 b4, b5, b6 b7, b8, b9 b10, b11, b12
· · ·
· · ·
(3)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a1, a2, a3 a4, a5, a6 a7, a8, a9 a10, a11, a12
b1, b2, b3 b4, b5, b6 b7, b8, b9 b10, b11, b12
a13 + b13 a14 + b14 a15 + b15
· · ·
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· · ·
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3 DB4
a1, a2, a3 a4, a5, a6 a7, a8, a9 a10, a11, a12
b1, b2, b3 b4, b5, b6 b7, b8, b9 b10, b11, b12
a13 + b13 a14 + b14 a15 + b15 a16 + b16
Starting with TK−1 = 3 symbols each requested from the first T = 3 databases, after the enforcing
of symmetries across databases and then across messages, we jointly consider the first T = 3
databases, DB1, DB2 and DB3. The amount of external side information available is 3 symbols
(b10, b11, b12), which allows a budget of one symbol of side information per database to be exploited
to recover new symbols of desired information. Assigning new labels to the side information symbols
being exploited by each database, we include a13+ b13, a14+ b14, a15+ b15 in the queries from DB1,
DB2 and DB3, respectively. Finally, enforcing symmetry across databases, correspondingly a16+b16
is added to DB4. At this point all symmetries are satisfied and the amounts of side-information
available and exploited are balanced. Thus the structure is complete.
4.3.2 Specialization
Let each message consist of NK = 16 symbols from a sufficiently large finite field Fq. The messages
W1, W2 ∈ F
16×1
q are therefore represented as 16× 1 vectors over Fq. Let S1, S2 ∈ F
16×16
q represent
random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly from all 16 × 16 full-
rank matrices over Fq. Without loss of generality, let us assume that W1 is the desired message.
Define 16× 1 vectors a[1:16] ∈ F
16×1
q and b[1:16] ∈ F
16×1
q , as follows
a[1:16] = S1W1 (19)
b[1:16] = MDS16×12S2[(1 : 12), :]W2 (20)
where S2[(1 : 12), :] is a 12 × 16 matrix comprised of the first 12 rows of S2. MDS16×12 is the
generator matrix of a (16, 12) MDS code. After plugging these values into query structure derived
earlier, the proof of correctness and privacy follows from the same reasoning as in the previous
examples. Note that since 16 desired symbols are recovered from a total of 28 downloaded symbols,
the rate achieved by this scheme is 16/28 = 4/7, which matches the capacity for this setting.
4.4 K = 3 Messages, N = 3 Databases, T = 2 Colluding Databases
The capacity for this setting, is C =
(
1 + 23 + (
2
3 )
2
)−1
= 919 .
4.4.1 Query Structure
The query structure is constructed as follows.
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2, a3, a4 a5, a6, a7, a8
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2, a3, a4 a5, a6, a7, a8 a9, a10, a11, a12
· · ·
· · ·
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2, a3, a4 a5, a6, a7, a8 a9, a10, a11, a12
b1, b2, b3, b4 b5, b6, b7, b8 b9, b10, b11, b12
c1, c2, c3, c4 c5, c6, c7, c8 c9, c10, c11, c12
(3)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2, a3, a4 a5, a6, a7, a8 a9, a10, a11, a12
b1, b2, b3, b4 b5, b6, b7, b8 b9, b10, b11, b12
c1, c2, c3, c4 c5, c6, c7, c8 c9, c10, c11, c12
a13 + b13 a15 + b15
a14 + b14 a16 + b16
a17 + c13 a19 + c15
a18 + c14 a20 + c16
· · ·
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· · ·
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2, a3, a4 a5, a6, a7, a8 a9, a10, a11, a12
b1, b2, b3, b4 b5, b6, b7, b8 b9, b10, b11, b12
c1, c2, c3, c4 c5, c6, c7, c8 c9, c10, c11, c12
a13 + b13 a15 + b15 a21 + b17
a14 + b14 a16 + b16 a22 + b18
a17 + c13 a19 + c15 a23 + c17
a18 + c14 a20 + c16 a24 + c18
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2, a3, a4 a5, a6, a7, a8 a9, a10, a11, a12
b1, b2, b3, b4 b5, b6, b7, b8 b9, b10, b11, b12
c1, c2, c3, c4 c5, c6, c7, c8 c9, c10, c11, c12
a13 + b13 a15 + b15 a21 + b17
a14 + b14 a16 + b16 a22 + b18
a17 + c13 a19 + c15 a23 + c17
a18 + c14 a20 + c16 a24 + c18
b19 + c19 b21 + c21 b23 + c23
b20 + c20 b22 + c22 b24 + c24
· · ·
· · ·
(3)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2, a3, a4 a5, a6, a7, a8 a9, a10, a11, a12
b1, b2, b3, b4 b5, b6, b7, b8 b9, b10, b11, b12
c1, c2, c3, c4 c5, c6, c7, c8 c9, c10, c11, c12
a13 + b13 a15 + b15 a21 + b17
a14 + b14 a16 + b16 a22 + b18
a17 + c13 a19 + c15 a23 + c17
a18 + c14 a20 + c16 a24 + c18
b19 + c19 b21 + c21 b23 + c23
b20 + c20 b22 + c22 b24 + c24
a25 + b25 + c25 a26 + b26 + c26
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2, a3, a4 a5, a6, a7, a8 a9, a10, a11, a12
b1, b2, b3, b4 b5, b6, b7, b8 b9, b10, b11, b12
c1, c2, c3, c4 c5, c6, c7, c8 c9, c10, c11, c12
a13 + b13 a15 + b15 a21 + b17
a14 + b14 a16 + b16 a22 + b18
a17 + c13 a19 + c15 a23 + c17
a18 + c14 a20 + c16 a24 + c18
b19 + c19 b21 + c21 b23 + c23
b20 + c20 b22 + c22 b24 + c24
a25 + b25 + c25 a26 + b26 + c26 a27 + b27 + c27
Starting with TK−1 = 4 symbols each requested from the first T = 2 databases, we proceed through
iterative steps (1) and (2) to enforce symmetries across databases and messages. In step (3) we
consider the first T = 2 databases together (DB1 and DB2) and account for the external side
information, which in this case contains 4 symbols from [bk] and 4 symbols from [ck]. Distributed
evenly among DB1 and DB2, this allows a budget of 2 symbols of side information from [bk] and
2 symbols from [ck] per database to be exploited to recover new symbols of desired information.
Proceeding again through steps (1) and (2) to enforce symmetries across databases and messages,
we end up with new downloads that contain only undesired information symbols, which can now
be used to download new desired information symbols. Once again, we consider DB1 and DB2
together, and account for the new external side information, b23 + c23, b24 + c24. Thus the external
side information is comprised of two symbols, each of which is a sum of the form bk + ck. Dividing
the side information evenly among databases DB1 and DB2, each is assigned one side-information
symbol of the form bk + ck with new labels. Thus, a25 + b25 + c25 is added to the query from DB1,
and a26 + b26 + c26 is added to the query from DB2. Finally, applying symmetry across databases,
we include a27 + b27 + c27 to the query from DB3. At this point, all symmetries are satisfied, all
external and exploited side-information amounts are balanced, and therefore, the query structure
is complete.
4.4.2 Specialization
Let each message consist of NK = 27 symbols from a sufficiently large finite field Fq. The messages
W1,W2,W3 ∈ F
27×1
q are then represented as 27×1 vectors over Fq. Let S1, S2, S3 ∈ F
27×27
q represent
random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly from all 27 × 27 full-
rank matrices over Fq. Without loss of generality, let us assume that W1 is the desired message.
Define 27× 1 vectors a[1:27], b[1:27], c[1:27] ∈ F
27×1
q , as follows
a[1:27] = S1W1 (21)
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b[1:18] = MDS18×12S2[(1 : 12), :]W2 (22)
c[1:18] = MDS18×12S3[(1 : 12), :]W3 (23)
b[19:27] = MDS9×6S2[(13 : 18), :]W2 (24)
c[19:27] = MDS9×6S3[(13 : 18), :]W3 (25)
where S2[(1 : 18), :] is a 18 × 27 matrix comprised of the first 18 rows of S2. MDS18×12 is the
generator matrix of a (18, 12) MDS code, and MDS9×6 is the generator matrix of a (9, 6) MDS
code. In particular, note that the same generator matrix is used in (22) and (23). Similarly, the
same generator matrix is used in (24) and (25). This is important because it allows us to write
b[19:27] + c[19:27] = MDS9×6 (S2[(13 : 18), :]W2 + S3[(13 : 18), :]W3) (26)
so that all 9 elements of the vector b[19:27] + c[19:27] can be recovered from any 6 of its elements,
e.g., from b[19:24] + c[19:24] one can also recover b25 + c25, b26 + c26, b27 + c27. This observation is the
key to understanding the role of interference alignment in this construction. The effective number
of resolvable undesired symbols is minimized due to interference alignment. For example, b19 and
c19 are always aligned together into one symbol b19+ c19 in all the downloaded equations. The two
are unresolvable from each other and act as effectively one undesired symbol in the downloaded
equations, thus reducing the effective number of undesired symbols, so that the same number of
downloaded equations can be used to retrieve a greater number of desired symbols. Note also that
desired symbols are always resolvable.
These values are plugged into the query structure derived previously.
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, a2, a3, a4 a5, a6, a7, a8 a9, a10, a11, a12
b1, b2, b3, b4 b5, b6, b7, b8 b9, b10, b11, b12
c1, c2, c3, c4 c5, c6, c7, c8 c9, c10, c11, c12
a13 + b13 a15 + b15 a21 + b17
a14 + b14 a16 + b16 a22 + b18
a17 + c13 a19 + c15 a23 + c17
a18 + c14 a20 + c16 a24 + c18
b19 + c19 b21 + c21 b23 + c23
b20 + c20 b22 + c22 b24 + c24
a25 + b25 + c25 a26 + b26 + c26 a27 + b27 + c27
Correctness is straightforward. Let us see why T -privacy holds. The queries for any T = 2 colluding
databases are comprised of 18 variables from a[1:27], 12 variables from b[1:18], 6 variables from b[19:27],
12 variables from c[1:18] and 6 variables from c[19:27]. Let the indices of these variables be denoted
by the vectors Ia ∈ N
18×1,Ib,12 ∈ N
12×1,Ib,6 ∈ N
6×1,Ic,12 ∈ N
12×1 and Ic,6 ∈ N
6×1, respectively,
so that,
aIa = S1[Ia, :]W1 (27)
bIb,12 = MDS18×12[Ib,12, :]S2[(1 : 12), :]W2 (28)
bIb,6 = MDS9×6[Ib,6, :]S2[(13 : 18), :]W2 (29)
cIc,12 = MDS18×12[Ic,12, :]S3[(1 : 12), :]W3 (30)
cIc,6 = MDS9×6[Ic,6, :]S3[(13 : 18), :]W3 (31)
From Lemma 1, we have
(aIa , (bIb,12 ; bIb,6), (cIc,12 ; cIc,6)) ∼ (S1[(1 : 18), :]W1, S2[(1 : 18), :]W2, S3[(1 : 18), :]W3)(32)
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Thus privacy is guaranteed. Finally, note that since 27 desired symbols are recovered from a total
of 57 downloaded symbols, the rate achieved by this scheme is 27/57 = 9/19, which matches the
capacity for this setting.
4.5 Arbitrary Number of Messages K, Arbitrary Number of Databases N , Ar-
bitrary Number of Colluding Databases T
4.5.1 Query Structure
For arbitrary K,N, T , we follow the same iterative procedure, briefly summarized below.
• Step 1: Initialization. Download TK−1 desired symbols each from the first T databases.
• Step 2: Invoke symmetry across databases to determine corresponding downloads from DB
T + 1 to DB N .
• Step 3: Invoke symmetry of messages to determine additional downloaded equations (com-
prised only of undesired symbols) from each database.
• Step 4: Consider the first T databases together. Divide the new external side information
generated in the previous step evenly among the first T databases to determine the side-
information budget per database. For each side information symbol allocated to a database
create an additional query of the same form as the assigned side information (with new labels)
combined with a new desired symbol.
• Step 5: Go back to Step 2 and run Step 2 to Step 4 a total of (K − 1) times.
4.5.2 Specialization
Let each message consist of NK symbols from a sufficiently large finite field Fq. The messages
W1, · · · ,WK ∈ F
NK×1
q are represented as N
K × 1 vectors over Fq. Let S1, · · · , SK ∈ F
NK×NK
q
represent random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly from all
NK ×NK full-rank matrices over Fq. Suppose Wl, l ∈ [1 : K], is the desired message.
Consider any undesired message index k ∈ [1 : K]/{l}, and all distinct ∆ = 2K−2 subsets of
[1 : K] that contain k and do not contain l. Assign distinct labels to each subset, e.g., K1,K2, · · · K∆.
For each k ∈ [1 : K]/{l}, define the vector


x
[k]
K1
x
[k]
K1∪{l}
x
[k]
K2
x
[k]
K2∪{l}
...
x
[k]
K∆
x
[k]
K∆∪{l}


=


MDSN
T
α1×α1
0 0 0
0 MDSN
T
α2×α2
0 0
0 · · ·
. . . 0
0 0 0 MDSN
T
α∆×α∆


Sk[(1 : TN
K−1), :]Wk
12
where αi, i ∈ [1 : ∆] is defined as N(N − T )
|Ki|−1TK−|Ki|, each x
[k]
Ki
is a αi × 1 vector, and each
x
[k]
Ki∪{l}
is a (N−TT )αi × 1 vector over Fq.
Now consider the desired message index l, and all distinct δ = 2K−1 subsets of [1 : K] that
contain l. Assign distinct labels to each subset, e.g., L1,L2, · · · Lδ. Define the vector


x
[l]
L1
x
[l]
L2
...
x
[l]
Lδ


= SlWl
where the length of x
[l]
Li
, i ∈ [1 : δ] is N(N − T )|Li|−1TK−|Li|.
For each non-empty subset K ⊂ [1 : K] generate the query vector
∑
k∈K
x
[k]
K (33)
Distribute the elements of the query vector evenly among the N databases. This completes the
specialized construction of the queries.
The construction has K layers. Over the j-th layer, from each database, we download (N −
T )j−1TK−j
(K
j
)
equations that are comprised of sums of j symbols, out of which (N−T )j−1TK−j
(K−1
j−1
)
involve desired data symbols. Our construction ensures that the interference x
[k]
Ki∪{l}
, k 6= l, i ∈ [1 :
∆] in the (|Ki| + 1)-th layer can be recovered from the corresponding symbols x
[k]
Ki
in the |Ki|-th
layer. Therefore correctness is guaranteed.
Let us see why privacy holds. The queries for any T colluding databases are comprised of TNK−1
variables from each x[k], k ∈ [1 : K]. In particular, ∀k 6= l, the variables from x[k] consist of αi
variables out of NT αi variables x
[k]
Ki
, x
[k]
Ki∪{l}
, for each set Ki, i ∈ [1 : ∆]. Note that these αi variables
are generated by the generator matrix of a (NT αi, αi) MDS code, so that they have full rank. Let
the indices of the appeared variables be denoted by the vectors Ix[k] ∈ N
TNK−1×1,∀k ∈ [1 : K].
From Lemma 1, we have
x
[k]
I
x[k]
∼ Sk[(1 : TN
K−1), :]Wk (34)
which in turn implies that Sk[(1 : TN
K−1), :] are independent and identically distributed. Thus
privacy is guaranteed.
Finally, we compute the ratio of the number of desired symbols to the number of total down-
loaded symbols,
R =
N
N
TK−1
(K−1
0
)
+ (N − T )TK−2
(K−1
1
)
+ (N − T )2TK−3
(K−1
2
)
+ · · ·+ (N − T )K−1
(K−1
K−1
)
TK−1
(
K
1
)
+ (N − T )TK−2
(
K
2
)
+ (N − T )2TK−3
(
K
3
)
+ · · · + (N − T )K−1
(
K
K
)
(35)
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=
N
N
NK−1
1
N−T
[
(N − T )TK−1
(K
1
)
+ (N − T )2TK−2
(K
2
)
+ · · ·+ (N − T )K
(K
K
)] (36)
=
1
NN
K
1
N−T (N
K − TK)
=
1− TN
1− T
K
NK
(37)
=
(
1 +
T
N
+
T 2
N2
+ · · ·+
TK−1
NK−1
)−1
(38)
Thus, the PIR rate achieved by the scheme always matches the capacity.
5 Proof of Theorem 1: Converse
For compact notation, let us define
Q
△
= {Q[k]n : k ∈ [1 : K], n ∈ [1 : N ]} (39)
A
[k]
I
△
= {A[k]n : n ∈ I} (40)
HT
△
=
1(N
T
) ∑
T :|T |=T
H(AT |Q)
T
,T ⊂ [1 : N ] (41)
We first state Han’s inequality (Theorem 17.6.1 in [35]), which will be used later and is described
here for the sake of completeness.
Theorem 3 (Han’s inequality)
HT ≥
H(A
[k]
1 , A
[k]
2 , · · · , A
[k]
N |Q)
N
(42)
We next proceed to the converse proof. The proof of outer bound for Theorem 1 is based on
an induction argument. To set up the induction, we will prove the outer bound for K = 1 and for
K = 2, each for arbitrary N,T , and then proceed to the case of arbitrary K.
5.1 K = 1 Message, N Databases
L = H(W1) = H(W1|Q) (43)
≤ I(A
[1]
1 , A
[1]
2 , · · · , A
[1]
N ;W1|Q) (44)
= H(A
[1]
1 , A
[1]
2 , · · · , A
[1]
N |Q) (45)
≤ NHT (46)
≤
N∑
n=1
H(An|Q) (47)
⇒ R =
L∑N
n=1H(An)
≤
L∑N
n=1H(An|Q)
≤ 1 (48)
where (46) follows from Han’s inequality, and (47) is due to the property that dropping conditioning
does not reduce entropy.
14
5.2 K = 2 Messages, N Databases
Consider T ⊂ [1 : N ] with cardinality |T | = T . Denote the complement of T as T .
Since the queries and answer strings for any T databases are independent of the message index,
we will denote A
[k]
T simply as AT ,∀k ∈ [1 : K]. From AT , A
[1]
T
, A
[2]
T
,Q, we can decode W1,W2.
2L = H(W1,W2) = H(W1,W2|Q) (49)
≤ I(AT , A
[1]
T
, A
[2]
T
;W1,W2|Q) (50)
= H(AT , A
[1]
T
, A
[2]
T
|Q) (51)
= H(AT , A
[1]
T
|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
|AT , A
[1]
T
,Q) (52)
= H(AT , A
[1]
T
|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
|AT , A
[1]
T
,W1,Q) (53)
≤ NHT +H(A
[2]
T
|AT ,W1,Q) (54)
= NHT +H(A
[2]
[1:N ]|W1,Q)−H(AT |W1,Q) (55)
= NHT + L−H(AT |W1,Q) (56)
where (51) is due to the fact that the answering strings are deterministic functions of the messages
and queries. (53) is due to the fact that W1 is a function of (AT , A
[1]
T
,Q). In (56), the second term
follows from the fact that from A
[2]
[1:N ]
, we can decode W2.
Consider (56) for all subsets of [1 : N ] that have exactly T elements and average over all such
subsets. We have
2L ≤ NHT + L−
1(N
T
) ∑
T :|T |=T
H(AT |W1,Q) (57)
≤ NHT + L− TH(A
[2]
[1:N ]|W1,Q)/N (58)
= NHT + L− TL/N (59)
⇒ L
(
1 +
T
N
)
≤ NHT ≤
N∑
n=1
H(An|Q) (60)
⇒ R =
L∑N
n=1H(An)
≤
L∑N
n=1H(An|Q)
≤
(
1 +
T
N
)−1
(61)
where (58) follows from the conditional version of Han’s inequality, and (59) is due to the fact that
from A
[2]
[1:N ], we can decode W2. The outer bound proof for K = 2 messages setting is complete.
5.3 K ≥ 3 Messages, N Databases
Consider T ⊂ [1 : N ] with cardinality |T | = T . From AT , A
[1]
T
, · · · , A
[K]
T
,Q, we can decode all K
messages W1, · · · ,WK .
KL = H(W1, · · · ,WK |Q) (62)
≤ I(AT , A
[1]
T
, · · · , A
[K]
T
;W1, · · · ,WK |Q) (63)
= H(AT , A
[1]
T
, · · · , A
[K]
T
|Q) (64)
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= H(AT , A
[1]
T
|Q) +H(A
[2]
T
, · · · , A
[K]
T
|AT , A
[1]
T
,Q) (65)
≤ NHT +H(A
[2]
T
, · · · , A
[K]
T
|AT , A
[1]
T
,W1,Q) (66)
≤ NHT +H(A
[2]
T
|AT ,W1,Q) +H(A
[3]
T
, · · · , A
[K]
T
|AT , A
[2]
T
,W1,Q) (67)
≤ NHT +
∑
n∈T
H(A[2]n |AT ,W1,Q) +H(A
[3]
T
, · · · , A
[K]
T
|AT ,W1,W2,Q) (68)
= NHT +
∑
n∈T
H(A[2]n |AT ,W1,Q) +H(AT , A
[3]
T
, · · · , A
[K]
T
|W1,W2,Q)−H(AT |W1,W2,Q)
(69)
= NHT +
∑
n∈T
H(A[2]n |AT ,W1,Q) + (K − 2)L−H(AT |W1,W2,Q) (70)
where (66) is due to the fact thatW1 is a function of (AT , A
[1]
T
,Q). (68) follows from the fact thatW2
is a function of (AT , A
[2]
T
,Q). In (70), the third term is due to the fact that from AT , A
[3]
T
, · · · , A
[K]
T
,
we can decode W3, · · · ,WK .
Consider (70) for all subsets of [1 : N ] that have exactly T elements and average over all such
subsets. We have
KL− (K − 2)L+
1(
N
T
) ∑
T :|T |=T
H(AT |W1,W2,Q) (71)
≤ NHT +
1(N
T
) ∑
T :|T |=T
∑
n∈T
H(A[2]n |AT ,W1,Q) (72)
≤ NHT +
1(N
T
) ∑
T :|T |=T
∑
n∈T
∑
T ′⊂T ,|T ′|=T−1
H(An|AT ′ ,W1,Q)
T
(73)
= NHT +
1(
N
T
) ∑
T ′:|T ′|=T−1
∑
n/∈T ′
(N − T )
H(An|AT ′ ,W1,Q)
T
(74)
= NHT +
1(N
T
) ∑
T :|T |=T
∑
n∈T
(N − T )
H(An|AT /{n},W1,Q)
T
(75)
≤ NHT +
1(
N
T
) ∑
T :|T |=T
(N − T )
H(AT |W1,Q)
T
(76)
≤ NHT + (
N
T
− 1)
1(N
T
) ∑
T :|T |=T
H(AT , A
[1]
T
|W1,Q) (77)
= NHT + (
N
T
− 1)
(
H(A
[1]
[1:N ],W1|Q)−H(W1|Q)
)
(78)
= NHT + (
N
T
− 1)
(
H(A
[1]
[1:N ]|Q) +H(W1|A
[1]
[1:N ],Q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−H(W1)
)
(79)
≤ NHT + (
N
T
− 1) (NHT − L) (80)
=
N2
T
HT − (
N
T
− 1)L (81)
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⇒ NHT ≥ L
(
1 +
T
N
)
+
T 2
N2
N
1(N
T
) ∑
T :|T |=T
H(AT |W1,W2,Q)
T
(82)
where (73) follows because dropping conditioning increases entropy. In (73) we drop the superscript
of A
[2]
n and write it simply as An because {A
[2]
n , AT ′} contain responses from only T databases,
which must be independent of the desired message index because of the requirement of T -privacy.
Equation (74) follows from the observation that given T ′, n, there are (N − T ) feasible choices
of T , i.e., those choices of T which contain T ′ and do not contain n. Thus, the same term
H(An|AT ′ ,W1, Q) repeats in the overall summation a total of (N − T ) times. To see why (76)
holds, suppose we write T = {n1, n2, · · · , nT }. By the chain rule of entropies,
H(AT |W1,Q) =
T∑
t=1
H(Ant |An1 , An2 , · · · , Ant−1 ,W1,Q) (83)
≥
T∑
t=1
H(Ant |AT /nt ,W1,Q) (84)
In (79), the third term equals 0, because from A
[1]
[1:N ], we can decode W1.
To proceed, we note that for the last term of (82), conditioning on W1,W2, the setting reduces
to a PIR problem with K−2 messages and N databases. Thus, (82) sets up an induction argument,
which claims that for the K messages setting,
NHT ≥ L
(
1 +
T
N
+ · · · +
TK−1
NK−1
)
(85)
We have proved the basis cases of K = 1 and K = 2 in (46) and (60). Suppose now the bound
(85) holds for K − 2. Then plugging in (82), we have that the bound (85) holds for K. Since both
the basis and the inductive step have been performed, by mathematical induction, we have proved
that (85) holds for all K. The desired outer bound follows as
R =
L∑N
n=1H(An)
≤
L∑N
n=1H(An|Q)
≤
L
NHT
≤
(
1 +
T
N
+ · · ·+
TK−1
NK−1
)−1
(86)
Thus, the proof of the outer bound is complete.
6 Proof of Theorem 2
Clearly the capacity of robust T -private PIR cannot be larger than the capacity of T -private PIR.
Therefore, we only need to prove that the capacity of T -private PIR can be achieved in the robust
PIR setting. To this end, we build upon the scheme presented in Section 4 as follows.
As before, let each message consist of NK symbols from a sufficiently large finite field Fq. The
messages W1, · · · ,WK ∈ F
NK×1
q are represented as N
K × 1 vectors over Fq. Let S1, · · · , SK ∈
F
NK×NK
q represent random matrices chosen privately by the user, independently and uniformly
from all NK ×NK full-rank matrices over Fq. Suppose Wl, l ∈ [1 : K], is the desired message.
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Consider any undesired message index k ∈ [1 : K]/{l}, and all distinct ∆ = 2K−2 subsets of
[1 : K] that contain k and do not contain l. Assign distinct labels to each subset, e.g., K1,K2, · · · K∆.
For each k ∈ [1 : K]/{l}, define the vector


x
[k]
K1
x
[k]
K1∪{l}
x
[k]
K2
x
[k]
K2∪{l}
...
x
[k]
K∆
x
[k]
K∆∪{l}


=


MDSM
T
α1×α1
0 0 0
0 MDSM
T
α2×α2
0 0
0 · · ·
. . . 0
0 0 0 MDSM
T
α∆×α∆


Sk[(1 : TN
K−1), :]Wk
where αi, i ∈ [1 : ∆] is defined as N(N − T )
|Ki|−1TK−|Ki|, each x
[k]
Ki
is a MN αi × 1 vector, and each
x
[k]
Ki∪{l}
is a MN (
N−T
T )αi × 1 vector over Fq.
Now consider the desired message index l, and all distinct δ = 2K−1 subsets of [1 : K] that
contain l. Assign distinct labels to each subset, e.g., L1,L2, · · · Lδ. Define the vector


x
[l]
L1
x
[l]
L2
...
x
[l]
Lδ


= MDSM
N
NK×NKSlWl
where the length of x
[l]
Li
, i ∈ [1 : δ] is M(N − T )|Li|−1TK−|Li|.
For each non-empty subset K ⊂ [1 : K] generate the query vector
∑
k∈K
x
[k]
K (87)
Distribute the elements of the query vector evenly among the M databases. This completes the
construction of the queries.
Suppose the user collects answering strings from any N databases. For each set Ki, from N
databases, we download αi symbols from x
[k]
Ki
, k 6= l, i ∈ [1 : ∆], from which we can recover the
interference x
[k]
Ki∪{l}
, as they are generated by the generator matrix of a (MT αi, αi) MDS code. After
subtracting out all the interference, we are left with NK desired symbols, from which we can recover
the desired message, as the symbols are generated by the generator matrix of a (MN N
K , NK) MDS
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code. Therefore correctness is guaranteed.
Let us see why privacy holds. The queries for any T colluding databases are comprised of TNK−1
variables from each x[k], k ∈ [1 : K]. When k = l, the TNK−1 desired symbols are generated by
the generator matrix of a (MN N
K , NK) MDS code such that these symbols have full rank. For each
k 6= l, the TNK−1variables from x[k] consist of αi variables out of
M
T αi variables x
[k]
Ki
, x
[k]
Ki∪{l}
, for
each set Ki, i ∈ [1 : ∆]. Note that these αi variables are generated by the generator matrix of
a (MT αi, αi) MDS code, so that they have full rank. Let the indices of the appeared variables be
denoted by the vectors Ix[k] ∈ N
TNK−1×1,∀k ∈ [1 : K]. From Lemma 1, we have
x
[k]
I
x[k]
∼ Sk[(1 : TN
K−1), :]Wk (88)
which in turn implies that Sk[(1 : TN
K−1), :] are independent and identically distributed. Thus
privacy is guaranteed. Finally, the rate achieved is the same as that achieved in the setting without
the robustness constraint. This completes the proof.
7 Conclusion
We characterize the capacity of robust T -private PIR with arbitrary number of messages, arbi-
trary number of (responding) databases, and arbitrary privacy level. Let us conclude with a few
observations. First, while in this paper we adopt the zero error framework, we note that our con-
verse extends in a straightforward manner to the ǫ-error framework as well, where the probability
of error is only required to approach zero as the message size approaches infinity. Therefore, for
robust T -private PIR, the ǫ-error capacity is the same as the zero error capacity. Second, recall
that the capacity achieving scheme for PIR in our prior work [25] had a remarkable feature that
if some of the messages were eliminated and the scheme projected onto a subset of messages, it
remained capacity optimal for that subset of messages. The same phenomenon is observed for our
achievable scheme for robust T -private PIR. On the other hand, an important point of distinction
of the previous achievable scheme in [25] from the achievable scheme in this paper is that the for-
mer directly uses each available side information symbol individually, whereas here we need MDS
coded side information (uncoded side information symbols do not suffice). This is because of the T -
privacy constraint which simultaneously creates multiple perspectives of external side-information
depending upon which subset of databases decides to collude.
Finally, we note that since we focus only on download cost, upload cost is not optimized in
this work. However, even with T -privacy, significant optimizations of upload cost are possible
through refinements of our achievable scheme. For example, the symbols may be grouped in a
manner that randomizations are needed only within smaller groups, which may reduce the number
of possible queries, and the size of the field of operations significantly. For example, consider
the achievable scheme for K = 2, N = 3, T = 2 that was presented in Section 4.1, where each
message is comprised of 9 symbols. We will operate over F2. Suppose we divide the 9 bits into
3 groups of 3 bits each, and label the groups so that A1 represents the first three bits of W1, A2
the next three and A3 represents the last three bits from W1. Similarly, let B1, B2, B3 represent
three groups of three bits each from W2. Now, for any group of 3 bits, say X = (x1, x2, x3),
let X(1),X(2),X(3) represent three randomly chosen linearly independent elements from the set
{x1, x2, x3, x1 + x2, x1 + x3, x2 + x3, x1 + x2 + x3}, i.e., selected uniformly from among the choices
that do not sum to zero in F2. This essentially means that X(1),X(2) may be freely chosen as any
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two distinct elements of the set and then X(3) is chosen uniformly from the 4 elements that are
not X(1),X(2) or X(1) +X(2). The queries are constructed as follows.
DB1 DB2 DB3
A1(1), A2(1) A2(2), A3(2) A3(3), A1(3)
B1(1), B2(1) B2(2), B3(2) B3(1 + 2), B1(1 + 2)
A3(1) +B3(1) A1(2) +B1(2) A2(3) +B2(1 + 2)
where we use the notation X(1+2) = X(1)+X(2) for brevity. Note that for the undesired symbols
B, we used the (2, 3) MDS code (B(1), B(2)) −→ (B(1), B(2), B(1+2)) within each group. Due to
the grouping of symbols the upload cost is significantly reduced. Moreover, because of the grouping
we are able to operate over a smaller field. Whereas the original scheme presented in Section 4.1
uses (6, 9) MDS codes which do not exist over F2, the refined example presented above uses only a
(2, 3) MDS code which does exist over F2. As illustrated by this example, optimizations of upload
costs as well as symbol size remain interesting avenues for future work.
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